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Authors Friedman and Williams trace briefly the diplomatic
history of the Group of 77 in United Nations fora, then detail the
role the G-77 plays within the Law of the Sea Conference. By pro-
viding illustrations of the G-77 bloc-policy process, the authors
construct a model to explain G-77 behavior. They conclude that
G-77 unity is now less certain than before because of the many
cross-cutting interests at stake in the UNCLOS III milieu. They
also cite Western intransigence as a unifying force for the G-77
under the "common enemy" principle.
INTRODUCTION
This is a study of the politics of a bloc of nations known as the
Group of 77. The countries that comprise this bloc are referred to
variously as "less-developed countries," "Third World countries,"
"developing countries," or "underdeveloped countries."' In a rela-
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1. These terms generally refer to the approximately 110 "poor" countries of
the world, located primarily in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
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tively short period of time they have banded together in a loose
coalition and have become an effective force in international rela-
tions. The principal forum for the exercise of this bloc power has
been the United Nations system and, in particular, the Third
United Nation Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS Il).
In the following pages we shall analyze the internal politics of
the Group of 77 (G-77). This article is not intended to be a po-
lemic, but rather an observational analysis of international group
dynamics in a lawmaking context. The positions and the model
posited in this study are flexible. We offer them in the hope that
they will improve and clarify the analysis of the G-77 phenome-
non at UNCLOS [11.2
The aim of this article is to explore the internal processes of the
G-77. We are seeking to describe the G-77 politics in a lawmaking
conference. The politics depend heavily on what is often called
"log-rolling." Log-rolling is the series of trade-offs and deals
across national and regional political boundaries that leads to
compromise in a multilateral negotiation. There is no dearth of
log-rolling in the G-77.
A Few Remarks About Methodology
In this inquiry we are limited by a lack of published material
about the inner workings of the G-77. We are also constrained by
the fact that although there is much information about the Law of
the Sea, such information rapidly becomes dated.
General works on the United Nations constitute a framework
for our analysis.3 Historical works on the Group of 77 in recent
years have also been useful.4 However, it has been necessary for
the authors to rely fairly extensively on a system of personal per-
2. For a good introduction to G-77 positions on seabed issues at UNCLOS H,
see D. LEIPZIGER & J. MUDGE, SEABED MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE ECONOMIIC IN-
TERESTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1976).
3. ATLANTIC COUNCIL WORKING GROUP ON THE UNITED NATIONS, THE FUTURE
OF THE U.N. (1977); S. BAILEY, THE PROCEDURE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
(1975); D. COYLE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND How IT WORKS (1966); E. GROSS, THE
UNITED NATIONS: STRUCTURE FOR PEACE (1962); H. HAN, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLA-
TION BY THE UNITED NATIONS (1971); H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(1950); P. MARIN, LORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES ET LE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX
(1971); H. SCHLUETER, DIPLOMATIE DER VERSOHNUNG (1966); L. SOHN, CASES ON
UNITED NATIONS LAW (1956); THE UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL SYSTEM (D. Kay ed.
1967); Q. WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1960); Di Qual,
Les Effets des R4solutions des Nations Unies, 37 BmILIOTHQUE DE DRoIT INTERNA-
TIONALE (1967).
4. M. AFIFI, THE ARABS AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1964); B. Gosovic,
UNCTAD: CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE (1972); K. HAGRAS, UNITED NATIONS CONFER-
ENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (1965); D. KAY, THE NEW NATIONS IN THE
UNITED NATIONS, 1960-1967 (1970); D. SHARMA, AFRO-ASAN GROUP IN THE U.N.
(1969). This list is not intended to be comprehensive but rather to be a sampling.
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spectives on the Law of the Sea and the G-77 countries. It is
hoped that this reliance on primary sources will not "cheapen"
the analysis, but rather will enhance its originality and topical rel-
evance.
The next part of this article will be a brief history of the Group
of 77. The third oportion will examine the G-77 at UNCLOS HI.
That part will also discuss G-77 perceptions, both internal and ex-
ternal. The fourth section of this article will illustrate who gets
what, where, when, how, and why in the G-77. We shall see how
the bloc phenomenon is played out in these international negotia-
tions. The final section will be a series of concluding remarks and
some tentative generalizations.
THE GROUP OF 77: A HISTORY
The formation of the G-77 has been described by some as the
"revolution of the Colonized."5 The countries of which we are
writing all share, in varying degrees, the characteristics of being
non-European, non-white, and anti-colonial.
6
Whether the racial or the colonial experiences are more impor-
tant is not at issue. The point is that the post-war world in the
third quarter of the twentieth century was a time of revolution
and liberation. The number of nation-States suddenly rose to
over 150. Many in the Western World called these nations "irre-
sponsible" because of the intensity of their ideological fervor.
Policy-makers of many industrial States feared the wrath of the
African, Asian, and Latin American raw-material producers who
were no longer content with extant market-pricing policies. The
dramatic steps taken by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) in 1973 terrified the formerly complacent de-
veloped States.7 This assertion of Third World power vis-ba-vis for-
mer colonial powers of the North portended a new order.
The Group of 77 was established in 1963, a decade before the
1973 oil embargo and subsequent price escalation. A group of
some seventy-five nations introduced the "Joint Declaration of
5. Bloomfield, The New Diplomacy in the United Nations, in THE UNnrED
STATES AND THE UNTrED NATIONS 49, 63 (1961).
6. Id. at 63.
7. The oil embargo of 1973-1974 was the first major producer action by devel-
oping countries to have a profound impact upon the richer nations. It changed the
perceptions of the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and others in a basic
way. The Third World had "roared," and the West was forced to listen.
the Developing Countries" into the United Nations General As-
sembly.8 The seventy-five nations were composed of African,
Asian, and Latin American States. Although their joint statement
itself was of no great significance, that they were able to sit down
and produce a joint statement was in itself a major accomplish-
ment. Branislav Gosovic has described how these less-developed
countries (LDC's) originally came together. He has also de-
scribed his version of their commonality of interest as follows:
Developing countries have many economic characteristics in common. In.
ter alia, their per capita incomes are below a certain cut-off point, their
rate of income growth per capita is relatively low for other reasons be-
cause of high population growth; only a small percentage of their labor
force is engaged in agriculture and there is a shortage of technical and
managerial skills. Their per capita investment in public works and ser-
vices is also low. Under these conditions capital goods, skilled labor, and a
modem technology are necessary requirements for economic growth.9
There are indeed economic, cultural, experiential, and political
links among the G-77 countries. However, the Group was not re-
ally born at the 1963 General Assembly session. It was not until
the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) in Geneva that the Group began to act as a unit on
substantive issues.
The Fourth Committee of UNCTAD was considering institu-
tional problems at the time. Gosovic tells us that the developing
countries had a vested interest in the establishment of a suitable
institutional machinery.'0 They used this machinery issue to act
together. As a result, the United States and other Western States
began to develop a somewhat negative attitude. In the sense that
this negative attitude galvanized the solidarity of the LDC's, the
West was at least partially responsible for the birth of the Group
of 77. The LDC's came to the realization that to remain divided
would be to remain a "bunch of beggars" and the "clientele of the
rich." Only united would the LDC's be a "political force.""
It is interesting to note that despite serious G-77 radical-wing
dissatisfaction with the emergent text on the institutional ma-
chinery question, all the developing countries stood behind the
draft once it was made public.12
No one had missed the point. The group of developing coun-
tries emerged from UNCTAD united. A new collective diplomacy
had come into being along with the creation of the Group of 77.
The Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Coun-
8. G.A. Res. 1897, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 24 app., U.N. Doc. A/5587
(1963).
9. B. Gosovic, UNCTAD: CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE 6 (1972).
10. Id. at 35.
11. Id. at 49.
12. Id. at 50.
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tries, which was issued at the end of the 1964 UNCTAD Confer-
ence in Geneva, read as follows:
The unity... has sprung out of the fact that facing the basic problems of
development they have a common interest in a new policy for interna-
tional trade and development.... The developing countries have a
strong conviction that there is a vital need to maintain, and further
strengthen, this unity in the years ahead. It is an indispensable instru-
ment for securing the adoption of new attitudes and new approaches in
the international economic field.
13
The Group of 77 is comprised of three regional groups and sev-
eral lesser ones. The main groups are the Latin American group,
the African group, and the Asian group.14 The Latins have the
longest history of regional organization and are unified by com-
mon language as well as by historical and cultural ties. The Or-
ganization of African Unity (OAU) is a regional group that forms
the basis of African solidarity, but a great deal of mistrust exists
between the Anglophone and Francophone countries. The Asians
are the least homogeneous politically and culturally. They have
no real organizational focus. The Asian group, after all, contains
countries as dissimilar as India and Thailand.
Before concluding our general discussion of the Group of 77, we
should take note of one last Gosovic observation. There are
cleavages within the G-77. Three main types can be outlined:
1. Those which are political and ideological in nature.
2. Those somewhere between the more and less advanced
countries in the G-77.
3. Those which result from the links of certain developing
countries with certain developed ones.15
We shall return with an analysis of these cleavages as they re-
late to the Law of the Sea Conference later in this study.
UNCLOS m AND TE G-77
United Nations discussion about a Law of the Sea Conference
first began around the time of the 1967 Algiers Group of 77 minis-
terial meeting. The Maltese Ambassador to the United Nations,
Dr. Arvid Pardo, introduced a draft agenda item dealing with the
13. Id. at 271.
14. These are not the only regional sub-groupings, but they do constitute the
most active ones.
15. B. Gosovic, UNCTAD: CoNF'ucT AND ComPRomsE 279 (1972).
area of the deep seabed and its resources. 16 Pardo said that the
area should be declared the common heritage of mankind and
that there should be an international conference to update the
Law of the Sea.17 New technological developments had given rise
to concern about capital-intensive deep seabed mining potential
in the West. The Group of 77 had little information about seabed
matters but wanted to ensure that they were not excluded from
any benefits of the enterprise.
UNCLOS mI convened in New York at United Nations head-
quarters in 1973 for a procedural meeting. The Group of 77 was
not very active at this stage of the negotiations but did set up an
overall UNCLOS caucus as well as individual committee coordi-
nating groups. For example, the Peruvian delegate to the Seabed
Committee became the G-77 coordinator for that committee.18
The leadership of the conference was as follows:
-The President of the Conference was an Asian.
-The Chairman of the First Committee (seabed issues) was an
African.
-The Chairman of the Second Committee (general LOS) was a
Latin American.
-The Chairman of the Third Committee (environment and
marine science) was an Eastern European (socialist bloc).
This left the Western European and Other (WEO) group with-
out representation in the Conference leadership. The G-77 had
succeeded in achieving a geographic system that gave all three
major positions to LDC's (President and First and Second Com-
mittee Chairmen).
The President of the Conference (H.S. Amerasinghe of Sri
Lanka) was a neutralist who was more interested in orderly nego-
tiations than in substance. The Seabed Chairman (Paul Bamela
Engo of Cameroon) was an activist whose behavior at the Confer-
ence was sometimes unpredictable. The Committee II Chairman
(Andres Aguilar of Venezuela) was an articulate advocate of the
Latin perspective on the territorialization of the seas, although he
displayed neutrality as Chairman. The Committee III Chairman
(Alexander Yankov of Bulgaria) was a neutralist in general.
UNCLOS III has debated and is still debating more than 400
treaty articles on issues ranging from seabed mining to hydrocar-
bon exploitation to fishery matters. Issues include archipelagic
16. Maltese Request, 22 U.N. GAOR, 2 Annexes (Agenda Item 92) 1, U.N. Doc.
A/6695 (1967).
17. Id.
18. Sefior Alvaro de Soto.
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States, the rights of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged
States (LL/GDS), environmental preservation, marine mammal
and fishery conservation, dispute settlement, International Sea-
bed Authority institutions and financial arrangements, and a host
of other matters. The issues demand both codification of extant
law and progressive development of new law to meet changing
circumstances.1 9
The number of cross-cutting interests among G-77 nations is as-
tounding. It is in the context of UNCLOS I that they can best be
illustrated.
Cross-cutting rifts and internal group rifts began to appear as
early as the 1974 Summer Session of UNCLOS I, which was held
at Caracas. For the first time since the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Con-
ferences, all the nations of the world came together to discuss the
world's oceans.
The Latins had previously been united on the policy of
patrimonio, their version of a territorial sea extending to a dis-
tance of 200 miles from shore. The patrimonial sea was a concept
which caused concern in several world capitals.2 0 In essence it
was a territorial sea as agreed to in a joint declaration of Chile,
Ecuador, and Peru just after World War II. This instance of
creeping jurisdiction was perceived as a threat to international se-
curity because it posed challenges to the traditional high seas
freedoms of naval vessels. Even more alarming was the possibil-
ity it might result in many of the world's major straits being
closed off as territorial seas.
The Latins had asserted their claims long ago. In the 1970 Dec-
laration of Montevideo, the countries of Argentina, Brazil, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uru-
guay acted together to restate their claim for a 200-mile territorial
sea.21 The major naval powers' concern increased.
Meanwhile, the G-77 delegates began to speak about revenue-
sharing and the common heritage of mankind. Sharp ideological
differences emerged in public statements. 22 The United States,
19. For example, the development of seabed mining technology has caused a
need for the progressive development of new law. This is law creation, not codifi-
cation.
20. Many naval powers disliked the idea of extended seas that would encroach
upon the traditional freedom of the seas concept.
21. L BROWNLIE, PRINciPLES OF PUBLIc ITERNATIONAL LAW 219 (2d ed. 1973).
22. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C.1/L.7 (1974) (G-77 statement).
Western Europe, and Japan were known to have companies work-
ing on perfecting seabed mining technology. As there were very
little hard data to go by, rumors multiplied. Examples include:
"The seabed has an endless supply of wealth." "The United
States is conspiring to keep everything secret." "The Third World
will be cheated."
Fierce North-South rhetorical conflict developed over the true
value of seabed minerals. Some American negotiators for sea-
bed issues were mistrusted and judged abrasive by foreign dele-
gates.23 Once again, Western intransigeance contributed to a
ground-swell of G-77 solidarity. The seabed issue became a rally-
ing point for the G-77 as the concept of res communis24 was reiter-
ated. Demands for exclusive control of the seabed came from
extreme G-77 members like Algeria and Tanzania. The Western
reaction was to demand an open and guaranteed access to seabed
resources.25
At the same time a controversy developed over the issue of
marine scientific research. Some coastal developing States cited
the Pueblo incident as evidence of United States intent to spy.
The concept of a "consent regime" developed in the Conference.
Poor countries were afraid that under the guise of "pure" science
the wealthy States would send ships to engage in "applied" sci-
ence.2 6 Armed with knowledge of the continental shelf's hydro-
carbon resources, the rich countries could then negotiate
concessions from the LDC's.
In the United States, meanwhile, marine scientists at major in-
stitutions insisted on retaining the freedom to conduct pure
oceanographic studies without being hindered. Simultaneously,
the disenfranchised countries of the world (i.e., those without
coastlines) banded together to form a group of landlocked States.
They were small in number until other States that felt geographi-
23. See Miles, The Structure and Effects of the Decision Process in the Seabed
Committee and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 31
INT'L ORG. 159 (1977).
24. This concept refers to the open and common nature of the seas and is in
contradistinction to res nullius, which refers to the seas as a no-man's land rather
than a shared commonality. L BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw 165 (1966).
25. In fact, one company involved in seabed mining went so far as to file a No-
tice of Discovery and Claim of Exclusive Mining Rights, and Request for Diplo-
matic Protection and Protection of Investment in November, 1974, reprinted in 14
INT'L LEGAL MATERIA S 51 (1975). This filing was not recognized by the State De-
partment but certainly widened the North-South chasm by going against the de-
veloping international legal consensus that there could be no exclusive claims.
26. Swing, Who Will Own the Ocean?, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 527, 541-42 (1976).
[VOL. 16: 555, 1979] An Emergent Force
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
cally disadvantaged 27 joined. The LL/GDS28 bloc grew to include
Northern and Southern nations alike.
Nations as dissimilar as Austria and Chad joined. The LL/GDS
constituted a "blocking third" of UNCLOS ]11.29 They threatened
to stop progress unless they were granted access to living and
non-living resources as well as to shares of revenue from the in-
ternational seabed area.
The seabed issue was becoming more and more complicated.
No longer was it simply a question of sharing the profits of future
seabed commercial recovery. Now a new group of States known
as the land-based producers (they are not formally organized per
se) united. These States demanded compensation guarantees in
the treaty to protect them from shortfalls in their foreign ex-
change earnings. They feared such shortfalls would result from a
drop in the prices of the four main seabed minerals-manganese,
copper, cobalt, and nickel-when ocean mining of the minerals
commenced. They also demanded production limitations, com-
modity agreements, and other financial compensation. Nations
such as Brazil, Chile, Gabon, Peru, Zaire, and Zambia lobbied
heavily within the G-77 for these goals and made many state-
ments in general plenary meetings of the Conference.
These were some of the highly controversial issues that devel-
oped in that first Summer Session in Caracas. For the purpose of
this article we shall now summarize these issues and describe
them in further detail in the section which follows. To recap the
above issues in Our study, they are:
-The deep seabed.
-Transit through straits and coastal waters.
-Marine scientific research.
-Landlocked and geographically disadvantaged State rights.
These are the issues. They cut squarely across ideologies and
geographic boundaries. They concern political and economic mat-
27. A country could "feel" geographically disadvantaged if it had a short coast-
line, a small continental shelf, or any number of so-called disadvantages.
28. LL/GDS is the abbreviation for landlocked and geographically disadvan-
taged States.
29. This means that because there are about 150 nations participating in UN-
CLOS Il and because the LL/GDS group comprises more than 50, it could theo-
retically hold up progress on a treaty if a vote required a two-thirds majority. The
likelihood of this happening appears small.
ters of great sensitivity. They divided the Group of 77 partici-
pants as well as Western nations.
In the following sections of this article, we will examine each of
the above issues. The positions of the parties interested in the
particular issue will be discussed. This discussion will serve as a
foundation for our subsequent construction of a model. The
model clarifies the cross-cutting interests and contradictions
within the G-77 at UNCLOS III.
The Deep Seabed
In this section the process by which G-77 delegates "hammer-
out" positions will be described. In the next section a model of
cross-cutting interests will be developed to aid our understanding
of the process.
The G-77 Position
The original G-77 position stipulated a strong seabed Authority
with the right to exploit the area itself. The Authority could have
not only a monopoly over exploitation but effective control of mar-
keting and production as well. Thus prices and markets in land-
based producers among the G-77 would not be affected adversely
by ocean mining.
In designing this early set of demands, the G-77 engaged in a
considerable amount of internal debate. Severe conflict was wit-
nessed during some of its caucus meetings on seabed matters.30
For example, at a typical G-77 meeting on seabeds, it might be
necessary to formulate G-77 policy on the type of seabed access
system. The following is a hypothetical reconstruction of such a
G-77 caucus meeting.
The meeting is chaired by Peru, the G-77 seabed coordinator.
Peru says that a common position must be reached in two hours
for a general meeting.
Algeria says that the seabed system must provide complete
control for the Authority which will be the sole operator. Private
entities should be banned from the Area.
In rapid succession, Tanzania, Libya, and Tunisia voice support
for the Algerian view. They make long interventions, harangue
their colleagues, and demand nothing less than complete control.
They charge the moderates 31 in the G-77 (e.g., Singapore and
Chile) with selling out to United States demands.
30. This observation is based on reports from caucus-meeting participants to
academic observers.
31. A "moderate" in the G-77 simply refers to G-77 nations that are willing to
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Now only an hour is left to resolve the matter.
Singapore takes the floor and says that there is no sell-out. It is
simply more practical to agree on a two-track access system that
gives control not only to the Authority but to private groups as
well.32 Otherwise, says Singapore, there will be no seabed mining
at all.
Algeria replies that if that is the position then it may be better
to abandon the Conference.
Neutral Senegal intervenes and agrees that complete control
can be achieved eventually but sides with Singapore in urging a
compromise. The coordinator (Peru) announces a fifteen-minute
recess in the meeting. There are only forty minutes left for a de-
cision.
During the recess some of the moderates (Brazil, Cameroon,
Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, Singapore and twenty other leaders
among the LDC's) circulate in the conference room. They lobby
"undecideds" such as Chad and Madagascar. The Algerians also
lobby. But there are more moderate leaders (20-30) than radical
leaders (6-10) in the G-77 (which has 114 members). The un-
decideds defer to the greater prestige and status of the moder-
ates, to their greater expertise and less militant personalities.
The coordinator bangs his gavel after what has turned into a
thirty-five minute recess. Only five minutes remain before Ple-
nary.33
The coordinator announces a compromise that calls for a dual
system of access (Authority and private corporations). He also
makes a plea for a future Authority system that will be more simi-
lar to the Algerian model but stresses the need for a compromise
now. A vote by hand is taken. The proposal wins with near una-
nimity. Only a few countries actually cared either way. The rest
deferred to moderate leaders.
Veteran UNCLOS III observer Edward Miles has written about
the same process of seabed negotiation.3 4 His perspective is a
negotiate, discuss, and compromise at UNCLOS I rather than to engage in ideo-
logical posturing and polemics.
32. This is similar to the United States proposal for a seabed regime.
33. A Plenary is the formal meeting of all delegations, with Heads of Delega-
tion in their respective chairs.
34. Miles, The Structure and Effects of the Decision Process in the Seabed Com-
mittee and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 31 Lrrr'L
ORG. 159, 207-08 (1977).
useful aid in our analysis. Here is what Miles says about the 1975
Geneva Session of the Conference:
As the Geneva session wore on, it became clear to the author that dele-
gate behavior in the Working Group of Committee I was a function of
three kinds of dynamics, no one set of which was necessarily closely re-
lated to the others. For instance, the "game" played at level I involved all
those participants with substantive interests in the negotiation. These
were primarily advanced countries with existing or potential capabilities
to exploit the seabed beyond national jurisdiction and developing country
land-based producers of certain minerals, the representatives of which
feared that they would be adversely affected by the production of miner-
als from seabed sources.
The "game" at level II involved Algeria as prime mover, but, since Ca-
racas, aided significantly by Tanzania and Mauretania and supported oc-
casionally by China. The point of this "game" was to link the seabed issue
tightly with demands for a New Economic Order. Most people in Geneva,
and this means most people in the Group of 77, began in fact to play this
game and this accounts for the enormous increase in representation in the
Group of 77 Contact Group as well as in the Working Group of Committee
I. It affected the entire proceedings and threatened the compromises ar-
rived at because for most countries this issue involves no serious substan-
tive interests. Not even the generation of revenues arouses much concern
since the assumption is that almost nothing will be left after these reve-
nues are applied to the Authority's overhead expenses and after ad-
versely-affected developing country land-based producers are compen-
sated.
For most people in Committee I, therefore, the seabed was an expend-
able issue in substantive terms and many delegations who attended the
Working Group did not have formal instructions from their governments.
As the ideological ingredient increased after week five, the leadership of
the Group of 77 began to split, with the initiative passing to the "radicals"
(i.e., Algeria, Tanzania, and China). The moderates tended to remain si-
lent, not wishing to leave themselves open to charges of being "tools of
Western imperialism." The development put the position of the Chairman
in jeopardy since, as Chairman, it was his responsibility to do everything
in his power to see that agreement was reached. But for the "radicals,"
playing the increasingly global game of the New Economic Order, some-
times to audiences not directly involved in the Conference, it does not
matter very much whether there is no agreement and the advanced coun-
tries unilaterally exploit the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. In fact,
this would be more grist for the ideological mill.
The "game" at level III involves the conflict of personalities, only two as-
pects of which have an impact on negotiation outcomes. The first con-
cerns the personality conflict between the US representative and a
number of his antagonists in the Group of 77. This is used, sometimes de-
liberately, as an aid to the Algerian approach by several delegations.
There is always a different, less overtly antagonistic response to other
delegations whose approaches are similar to the US. The stridency which
often enters into the debate when the US is a participant is ascribed by
several delegates to personal dislike of the US representative. By feeding
the ideological fires, this conflict makes compromise sometimes more diffi-
(ults35
35. Id. (emphasis original).
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Other Seabed Positions
The United States delegation will have a set of rather explicit
negotiating instructions from Washington. These guidelines are
developed in an inter-agency United States policy process that in-
volves several government departments.36 The delegation will in-
clude officials from the Departments of Commerce, Defense,
Interior, State, Treasury, and others, as well as congressional visi-
tors. During the UNCLOS 1Tr sessions, the United States "team"
will coordinate policy and plan negotiating strategy and tactics.
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Brit-
ain, and other Common Market countries may constitute a loose
coalition at the negotiating table. These countries either have or
soon will have seabed mining technology. They prefer a carefully
circumscribed seabed Authority. They also prefer protections for
seabed miners such as guaranteed access to the Area, security of
tenures, sanctity of contract, and other explicit provisions. Their
claim is that these detailed provisions are needed to obtain capi-
tal for massive seabed investments.
Transit Through Straits and Coastal Waters-The G-77 Position
The issue of passage through straits was settled early in the
Conference. There are about 116 internationally utilized straits in
the world. With the advent of a new twelve-mile territorial sea,
many could have been "closed off" by strait-State prerogative.
But there has been general agreement on the notion of "transit
passage" through straits. Put simply, most countries agree that
passage through straits is to be free and unimpeded regardless of
the breadth of territorial waters.
3 7
The issue of other coastal waters is less clear. Latin American
States have claimed extended territorial seas for some time.38
The concept of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) has
now gained worldwide acceptance. The EEZ provides resource
jurisdiction (e.g., oil and fishery) but not territorial rights. Some
militant territorialists in the G-77 seek to convert the EEZ into a
36. For a detailed study of the United States policy process in Washington and
on the delegation, see Friedman, U.S. Law of the Sea Policy: A Bureaucratic Polit-
ics Analysis, 2 MAR. POL'Y 304 (1978).
37. The new treaty would establish a 12-mile territorial sea.
38. For a discussion of the patrimonial sea, see text accompanying note 20
supra.
territorial sea. Moderate G-77 members agree that the EEZ is sui
generis, with high seas rights for matters of passage.
The Naval Power Position
Naval powers have an interest in free and unimpeded passage
through straits for surface ships and submarines. They also have
an interest in free overflight of straits. This is a constant interest.
The economic zone issue is another matter of concern. Most na-
val powers want to ensure that there will be no encroachment of
the freedom of the seas. Here a shared perception exists on the
part of naval powers and of G-77 moderates that the EEZ must be
considered sui generis for international legal purposes.
Marine Scientific Research (MSR)
Within the G-77 exists the conviction that marine scientific re-
search cannot be allowed without coastal State consent. The ma-
jority of G-77 countries are poor and unsophisticated. They fear
Western science as potentially deleterious to their interests. Nev-
ertheless, MSR is a relatively easy issue, and the G-77 unity is
helpful.
For example, the G-77 meeting on MSR policy might last a very
short time. The 100 or so G-77 delegates gather. The Chairman of
the G-77 announces that they must oppose free MSR and demand
a consent regime. He asks for objections. There are none. The
consent regime is so decided upon.
The United States Position
The United States is motivated by a desire to protect freedom
of scientific research for its major oceanographic institutions. It
is, however, a losing battle. The consent regime is a clear-cut vic-
tory for the G-77. The Soviet Union, too, favors a consent regime
as it is cautious about foreign activities near its shores. The
United States is isolated on this issue.
LL/GDS Interests Within the G-77
A significant number of landlocked and geographically disad-
vantaged States have pressed to have their interests accommo-
dated. Only some of these States are G-77 members. A split
exists within the G-77 on LL/GDS rights. Some coastal States are
reluctant to grant access to neighboring LL/GDS. For example,
Venezuela has refused to grant surplus fishing rights to the neigh-
boring Caribbean islands. Despite G-77 rhetoric, many coastal
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States want their resources and are not necessarily generous to
other G-77 LL/GDS.
The United States Position
The United States has attempted to stay out of the debate, but
some LL/GDS members see an advantage in drawing the United
States into it. Some moderate G-77 LL/GDS States may view
United States intervention at UNCLOS III as a quid pro quo for
support on United States seabed goals.
The United States position, however, remains one of exceed-
ingly tacit support for the following three goals:
1. Access to the sea and transit rights for LL/GDS.
2. Revenue sharing from continental margin resources beyond
200 miles.
3. Access to some portion of the living resources in the zones
of neighboring States in the region.
39
A Word on Perceptions
It should be clear at this point that the United Nations milieu is
more than the sum of the G-77 and the other States. The milieu
consists of the G-77, the United States, the Soviet Union, the Eu-
ropean Economic Community, the LL/GDS, the land-based pro-
ducers, the regional groups of Africa, Asia, Latin America, the
Middle East, the coastal States, the ideological extremists, the
neutrals, and others. What all have in common is a desire to ob-
tain their individual objectives. This is often accomplished
through compromise with one another. Cross-cutting interests
within and without the G-77 make for the kind of "log-rolling"
spoken of in the Introduction above.
Nevertheless, the G-77 is often regarded as a monolithic entity
by UNCLOS II participants. This has been less true as the nego-
tiations have continued. Fissures in G-77 solidarity have become
more visible. The important point is that the notion of a solely de-
terminative "North-South" conflict is increasingly fallacious in the
Law of the Sea Conference. The rich and poor nations do conflict,
but not as exclusively as used to be the case.
39. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNCLASSIFIED DELEGATION REPORT ON THE THIRD
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, AUGUST 2 - SEPTEMBER 17,
at 11 (1976).
WHO GETS WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, How, AND WHY
As a generalization derived from the above and a prelude to the
organization of our model, we can observe that the G-77 fre-
quently appears united but is troubled by internal divisions. On
matters of parochial interest, the cross-cutting views of the UN-
CLOS delegates have divided the G-77. Collusion may exist be-
tween the G-77 and non-G-77 States. Behind a common front of
G-77 unity there is at times a labyrinth of fratricide and disunity.
In this section we shall construct a model illustrating cross-cut-
ting interests within the G-77. It is hoped that this model will syn-
thesize what has been described up to this point. It will become
immediately clear to the reader from this model that although
UNCLOS I is a lawmaking exercise, it is profoundly political in
nature.
The Model
"Log-rolling" or "back-scratching" is an important concept in G-
77 behavior. It is often determinative of policy. The series of
trade-offs that occurs will be illustrated through the construction





In a two-country model we start with country A and country B.
Country A is a land-based producer of seabed minerals and wants
compensation against losses in export earnings which would be
incurred by land-based producers as a direct result of seabed
mining. Country B is a coastal State that wants a 200-mile territo-
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rial sea. Both are moderate leaders that are respected and influ-
ential within the G-77.
They make a deal ("deals," or trade-offs, are suggested by lines
between the letters in Figure 1). Country A will support a G-77
position on 200-mile territorial seas if country B supports a G-77
position on compensation for land-based producers. In the G-77
meetings they help each other by lobbying these causes.
Enter country C, a large, technologically advanced seabed min-
er with several security interests as a naval power. Country C op-
poses compensation for land-based producers and opposes a 200-
mile territorial sea. Nevertheless, country C's security interests
are more important than its view on land-based producer compen-
sation. Country C approaches country A and strikes up a secret
deal.
Country A agrees to reduce its support for a 200-mile territorial
sea despite its pledge to country B. In return, country C, a large
and powerful naval State, will publicly support compensation for
land-based producers. This support will have significant impact
on the entire negotiating process.
Enter country D, a G-77 member and a member of the LL/GDS
group. Country D and countries C and A agree to strike separate
deals.
Country D will support land-based producer compensation in
return for country A's supporting neighbor-State access rights for
landlocked States.
Country D will oppose 200-mile territorial seas and speak in-
stead of economic zones in return for country C's subtle and be-
hind-the-scenes support for the rights of LL/GDS.
Enter country E, an archipelagic State. Country E wants con-
trol of its archipelagic waters as a territorial sea area.
Country E makes deals with countries A, B, and C. Country A
will support the archipelagic position if country E will support
compensation for land-based producers. Country B will support
the archipelagic position if country E will support a 200-mile terri-
torial sea. Country C will support the archipelagic position with
some modification. Country C requires freedom of transit for its
military ships. Country C therefore supports country E, if coun-
try E will agree to allow free and unimpeded transit for military
ships through archipelagic waters and straits.
It should be clear by now that we could go on building many
more models. Let us add just one more country. Enter country
X. Country X is a territorialist and a land-based producer!
Country X makes deals with countries A, B, C, and E. Country
A agrees to support X as a fellow land-based producer to
strengthen its own hand. Country B supports country X as a fel-
low territorialist, which strengthens that interest bloc. Country C
agrees to support compensation in return for some modification
on the 200-mile territorial sea (i.e., some transit). Country E sup-
ports both compensation and a 200-mile territorial sea in return
for Country X's support of archipelagic matters.
Why Does It Happen?
The behavior outlined above is witnessed a hundred times over
at UNCLOS I. Why?
The above model shows only the more obvious cross-cutting in-
terests. However, these types of alliances will also be affected by
which countries speak the same languages, by regional politics
around the world, by which delegates are friendly to one another,
by personality, by seniority at the Conference, by the standing of
the various countries, by prestige, by power, and by other in-
tangibles.
The Presidential Crisis and the G-77
At the start of the Geneva Spring 1978 Session, a major proce-
dural crisis occurred. It is highly illustrative of G-77 politics.
The President of the Conference, a Sri Lankan, lost his coun-
try's accreditation because of domestic Sri Lankan politics. With-
out any accreditation, he was vulnerable to a challenge.
The Latin American group challenged his tenure as President
for several reasons. First, there was an attempt on the part of the
Latin American group to gain more power for its own leader, who
served as Second Committee Chairman. Second, some Latin
American coastal States were afraid that the President favored
LL/GDS interests. Third, several countries were concerned with
the establishment of a legal precedent in regard to the chairing of
UNCLOS Il by an unaccredited citizen.
Within the G-77 the UNCLOS II President had the backing of
the African, Arab, and Asian groups. Nonetheless, the Latins
mounted a serious challenge strengthened by their coordination
and timing.
In the end, a vote was taken by the Conference. The African-
Arab-Asian bloc prevailed over the Latins. For thefirst time in the
history of the Group of 77, a split was evidenced in a public UN-
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CLOS IfIforum! Africans and Asians complained about Latin at-
tempts at domination. They were disturbed by Latin pressure.
This was an unprecedented public split.
CONCLUSION
If the power of the extremists is to be reduced, it must be done by the
Group of 77 itself. This requires that the Group come to perceive the ex-
tremists' veto as an abuse of power-an abuse which is contrary to the in-
terests of the majority of the Group of 77.40
These are the words of a former United States negotiator in the
Seabed Committee. They are, at least in part, the thesis and
message of this study. Minor interests in the G-77 have distorted
and altered the shape of what could have been far more rational
negotiations. Sometimes the ideological extremists have twisted
the shape of the G-77. Sometimes the G-77 special interests, like
those of the land-based producing States, have succeeded in sig-
nificantly influencing negotiating positions, although they them-
selves constitute a minority within the G-77.
Richard Darman, the former United States Deputy Head of Del-
egation at UNCLOS III, has also written the following:
It requires a more sophisticated appreciation of where real interests lie
than is possibly connoted by North-South bloc posturing. Here the United
States could help by refusing to accept the absurdly simplistic North-
South mindset. Indeed, the specific interests and cultures within the
South are so varied that were it not for a posture of unity reactively as-
sumed by the North, it is difficult to imagine what abstraction could serve
to hold the G-77 together.
4 1
This is precisely what Gosovic was indicating when he illus-
trated how United States and Western intransigeance helped to
coalesce the fledgling G-77 at the first Geneva Session of
UNCTAD. Indeed, nothing is as powerful an instrument of group
formation, a tool of solidarity creation, or a unifying catalyst of
disparate elements as a common enemy.
If this is the case then why is the G-77 currently so divided and
many-headed in its actions? The answer lies in the contradictory
and complex internal politics of the G-77. Cross-cutting interests
and alliances between G-77 and non-G-77 countries are frequently
the source of friction. In concluding, then, we must note the fol-
lowing
40. Darman, The Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S. Interests, 57 FOREIGN AFF. 592
(1978).
41. Id.
1. Whereas the G-77 has previously been able to resolve in-
ternal differences without any public exposure, this situation is
now changing.
2. Whereas the West has contributed to the solidification of
the G-77 (under the "common enemy" principle), the G-77 is
steadily losing its unity. There are repeated instances of richer G-
77 nations prospering in United Nations fora at the expense of
their poorer fellow G-77 members.
3. Intangibles like personality, prestige, and standing are fac-
tors that affect the scope and direction of substantive policy.
There are no immediate solutions to remedy this phase of G-77
malaise. The behavior of the G-77 can be modified no more easily
than can that of the West.
It is true that the rise of the G-77 has changed the shape of in-
ternational organizational politics. Group of 77 activities at multi-
lateral conferences have a variety of side effects. The militant
nature of the G-77 has placed the West on the defensive, just as
the reactive behavior of the West has helped solidify the G-77. It
is also important to note that the number of countries that com-
prise the G-77 has increased to include more than 110 nations.
The G-77 has contributed somewhat to the curious quasi-parlia-
mentary nature of lawmaking exercises such as UNCLOS II.
The influence of the G-77 will continue to be felt, but its solidar-
ity is being tested. The multipolar nature of our changing world is
having an unsettling effect on this bloc of nations because many
issues and interests affect the G-77. The role of the G-77 probably
will continue to change. This seems to be a natural process. Re-
gardless of what view one espouses, the impact of the Group of 77
cannot be denied: A revolution in modern diplomacy has oc-
curred.
